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Abstract. We give two impossibility results regarding strong encryption
over an infinite enumerable domain. The first one relates to statistically
secure one-time encryption. The second one relates to computationally
secure encryption resisting adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in stream-
ing mode with bounded resources: memory, time delay or output length.
Curiously, both impossibility results can be achieved with either finite or
continuous domains. The latter result explains why known CCA-secure
cryptosystem constructions require at least two passes to decrypt a mes-
sage with bounded resources.
1 Introduction
As the cardinality of sets increases, it is a well known fact from set theory
that some mathematical problems can suddenly become impossible to solve then
become possible again. For instance, for any logical assertion on finite sets we
can always decide whether it is true of false. When the set becomes infinite but
enumerable (that is, the cardinality of ℵ0 following the Cantor notion) some
mathematical statements can become undecidable as shown by Go¨del with the
Peano arithmetic. That is, statements of the form
∀x ∃y f(x, y) = 0
may be undecidable even though f has a polynomial form with integral variables
and coefficients. When sets become larger, e.g. the cardinality 2ℵ0 of continuous
sets, predicates based on inequalities can be decided. That is, over logical asser-
tion with elementary formula of form f(x) = 0 or f(x) > 0 can be decided as
shown by Tarski [29].
Assuming the continuum hypothesis we have ℵ1 = 2ℵ0 but ℵ1 can be smaller
otherwise. This hypothesis is undecidable in the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory axiomatic with the axiom of choice.
In cryptography, results on strong encryption are well understood. Since
Shannon, we know how to achieve perfect secrecy on finite sets by using the
Vernam cipher (aka one-time pad). One-time pad can also be defined on the
continuous unit interval [0, 1] by using the modulo 1 addition of a message and a
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key. However, it was shown by Chor and Kushilevitz [9, 10] that it was impossible
to achieve over ℵ0 under some ad-hoc generalization of the Shannon secrecy.
Similarly, we can construct computationally secure encryption (in the sense
of security against chosen-ciphertext adversaries) using hybrid encryption [12].
However, all proposed constructions require scanning the ciphertext twice for
decryption so the decryption algorithm cannot work with finite resources in
streaming mode over ℵ0. In practice, this necessarily wastes resources in time
and in memory. An open problem [1, 2] is whether strong encryption schemes
exist that can be streamlined, and more so the case when the domain is infinite.
In this paper, we first revisit the Chor-Kushilevitz result. We show that their
notion of security is unnecessarily strong and show the impossibility over ℵ0
with a weaker notion. We then analyze the practicality of strong encryption, i.e.
if it is possible to achieve strong encryption when the scheme’s resources are
bounded, either in memory or in time. Indeed, when a provably secure scheme
especially one for which has infinite domain is implemented in practice, bounded
resources are an inevitable artifact. In this setting, one wonders if the provable
security results are preserved from theory to practice. If security is preserved,
this indicates that the strong encryption scheme even one with infinite domain
can be streamlined since bounded resources imply that an infinite input cannot
be processed immediately but necessarily requires streamlining.
To be precise, by bounded memory we mean that as the scheme’s encryp-
tion or decryption process is streamlined, its internal state utilized during the
process has a bound which is a polynomial function of the security parameter.
By bounded time, we mean that the scheme’s process issues the output stream
only after some delay, rather than immediately as input streams are received.
To this end, we can alternatively model the latter as the process issuing outputs
of bounded length.
1.1 Related Work
In a different direction but related to the context of bounded resources, re-
searchers have studied security models in which adversaries have bounded mem-
ory [26, 19], as a compromise to achieve information theoretic security against
computationally unbounded adversaries.
The first known provable security notion for (public-key) encryption is in-
distinguishability (IND) (or so called polynomial security) [18], which has an
equivalent alternative definition called semantic security [18]. These character-
izations did not consider adversarial access to the decryption oracle, and thus
fall within the chosen-plaintext adversarial model (CPA). Later IND character-
izations refined this to the chosen-ciphertext adversarial model (CCA) [27, 28,
8].
Given that the CCA adversarial model allows the adversary access to the
decryption oracle, the basic idea in the design of CCA-secure schemes is to make
this decryption oracle useless to the adversary in terms of breaking IND. For
this, some implicit or explicit form of validity check [25] is typically designed into
the decryption algorithms of these schemes. This necessitates having two passes
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over the text input: for encryption, the first pass over the plaintext to obtain
the ciphertext while the second pass over the plaintext is to generate a validity-
checking tag for later verification when decrypting ciphertext; for decryption,
the first pass over the ciphertext decrypts it to obtain the plaintext and the
second pass over the text verifies if it actually corresponds to the received tag
before the plaintext is actually output.
While two passes currently seem inevitable for strong security, indeed no
known strong encryption schemes exist with a single pass; yet for practical uses
(e.g. these days it is common to be downloading hundreds of megabytes of data
over the Internet) it is advantageous to achieve a streaming capability, i.e. the
second pass can start before the end of the first pass; sort of similar to the concept
of streaming video: start watching before the entire movie is downloaded. This
has efficiency implications, e.g. there is no need to buffer the entire text, and the
encryption/decryption speed increases. Achievement of streamability for strong
encryption would indicate that strong encryption schemes over infinite domains
exist.
For the symmetric (blockwise) encryption context, the concept of online en-
cryption and decryption [3, 4, 13, 14] has been considered. The motivation for
this is related to the desire to provide a kind of streaming capability without
needing to buffer the entire text or wait until the entire text is received before it
starts to be processed. To be precise, online means that the output block can be
returned on the fly in one pass, given only the key, the current input block and
previous input and output blocks: the rest of the input blocks are not required
for returning the output block up to this point. IND notions have been proposed
for this particular setting to consider blockwise-adaptive adversaries [21, 15], in
both CPA and CCA style adversarial models [15, 14, 4].
It is known [9, 10] that weakly secure (in some statistical sense) symmetric
encryption is impossible over infinite sets such as {0, 1}∗ although it is possible
over larger sets such as [0, 1]. As for public-key encryption, statistical security is
of course impossible so we have to consider computational security.
2 Preliminaries
Let A∗ denote the set of finite sequences of elements in a set A; ε denote a
sequence of length zero so that ε ∈ A∗ for any A; x ∈U A denote uniformly
selecting an element in a set A; and ‖ denote the concatenation operation in A∗.
For x ∈ A∗, |x| denotes the length of x; ℵ0 denotes the cardinality of the set of
natural numbers N, which is the smallest possible infinite set.
In the sequel, we consider encryption over the infinite domain {0, 1}∗. For
technical reasons we formalize this domain by a prefix-free language C = {0, 1}∗‖>,
i.e. the set of words consisting of an arbitrary bitstring terminated by the spe-
cial > symbol. When considering messages given as bit streams, this symbol
indicates that the message is complete.
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2.1 Public Key Encryption (PKE)
A public-key encryption scheme PKE consists of three algorithms, PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc, and PKE.Dec. It must be such that there exists some integer κ for
which:
1. 〈pk, sk〉 ← PKE.KeyGen(1λ): A probabilistic algorithm that on input the
security parameter λ, generates public and private keys 〈pk, sk〉 by taking
time bounded by λκ for some integer κ.
2. c ← PKE.Encpk(m; r): A probabilistic algorithm that encrypts a message
m ∈ M into a ciphertext c by using some random coins r and taking time
bounded by (|m|+ λ)κ.
3. m ← PKE.Decsk(c): An algorithm that decrypts c by taking time bounded
by (|c| + λ)κ. It outputs either m ∈ M or a special symbol ⊥ /∈ M. An
obvious correctness condition applies.
Let AE be a polynomial-time oracle machine that plays the following adaptive
chosen-ciphertext game:
[IND-ATK PKE] Game
1: 〈pk, sk〉 ← PKE.KeyGen(1λ)
2: 〈m0,m1, ρ〉 ← AO
ATK
1
E (pk)
3: b ∈U {0, 1}; r ∈U {0, 1}(|m0|+λ)κ ; c∗ ← PKE.Encpk(mb; r)
4: b˜← AOATK2E (ρ, c∗)
Note that it is required for |m0| = |m1|.
Depending on how the decryption oracles OATK1 and OATK2 are defined, differ-
ent characterizations of the game can be obtained to capture relevant security
notions. For instance, to capture notions related to indistinguishability against
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) [28], OATK1 is defined as:
Oracle OCCA1 (c)
1: m← PKE.Decsk(c)
2: return m
Here, the oracle terminates and returns control to the adversary AE via the
return statement. Meanwhile it is required that AE be restricted not to ask
c∗ to OATK2 , i.e. OATK2 only replies to queries that do not equal the challenge
ciphertext c∗:
Oracle OCCA2 (c)
1: if c 6= c∗ then
2: m← PKE.Decsk(c)
3: return m
4: else
5: return ⊥
6: end if
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This can be relaxed in an IND-rCCA game [8], where the decryption oracle OATK2
behaves as follows:
Oracle OrCCA2 (c)
1: m← PKE.Decsk(c)
2: if m 6∈ {m0,m1} then
3: return m
4: else
5: return ⊥
6: end if
In the much weaker IND-CPA game [18], the oracle OATK2 is unavailable by defi-
nition:
Oracle OCPA2 (c)
1: return ⊥
Note that in the context of PKEs, the encryption oracle is public by construction.
For symmetric encryption, however, access to the encryption oracle characterizes
[22, 23] an additional dimension to the adversary’s capability and hence corre-
sponding security notion. In that case, an even weaker notion, so-called one-time
encryption (IND-OTE) game [12, 24] and capturing passive security makes even
the encryption oracle unavailable to the adversary.
We define AdvIND-ATKPKE,AE = |Pr[b˜ = b]− 12 | and
AdvIND-ATKPKE = max
AE
(AdvIND-ATKPKE,AE )
where maximum is taken over all ppt machines. We say that a PKE is IND-ATK-
secure if AdvIND-ATKPKE is negligible in λ, where ATK ∈ {CCA, rCCA,CPA}.
2.2 Some Streamline Cryptosystems
As already observed, known IND-CCA-secure constructions require decryption to
scan the ciphertext at least twice. However, encryption can process by scanning
the plaintext once. Examples include the well-known Cramer-Shoup scheme [11]
and variants [12], different forms of hybrid encryption [12, 2, 1, 20], and identity-
based encryption (IBE) schemes [7, 5, 6, 25].
If we now relax the security notion down to IND-CPA security, we can achieve
secure stream encryption with bounded resources. Consider a public-key encryp-
tion scheme OLDPKE over a finite domain (e.g., RSA). Consider a pseudorandom
generator PRG whose input lies in the encryption domain. Namely, for any in-
teger n, PRGn is a function producing an n-bit string from some random coins.
We define an encryption scheme NEWPKE by:
1. NEWPKE.KeyGen = OLDPKE.KeyGen
2. NEWPKE.Encpk(m; 〈k, r〉) = 〈OLDPKE.Encpk(k; r),m⊕ PRG|m|(k)〉
3. NEWPKE.Decsk(〈c, c′〉) = c′ ⊕ PRG|c′|(OLDPKE.Decsk(c))
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Clearly, both encryption and decryption can process streams with bounded re-
sources.
Theorem 1. If OLDPKE is IND-CPA-secure and PRG is IND-secure then NEW-
PKE is IND-CPA-secure.
We recall that IND security for PRG is defined by the following game:
[IND PRG] Game
1: 〈1n, ρ〉 ← A(1λ)
2: b ∈U {0, 1}; k ∈U K;
3: if b = 0 then
4: c← PRGn(k)
5: else
6: c ∈U {0, 1}n
7: end if
8: b˜← A(ρ, c)
Proof. Let Γ b1 be the IND-CPA game conditioned to the value of bit b. Note that
the 3rd step of Γ b1 is
3: k ∈U K; r ∈U {0, 1}(|m0|+λ)κ ; c∗1 ← OLDPKE.Encpk(k; r);
c∗2 ← mb ⊕ PRG|mb|(k); c∗ = 〈c∗1, c∗2〉
Given a ppt AE and a game Γ , we denote by Γ (AE) the event that AE wins.
For instance, Γ b1 (AE) is the event that AE produces b˜ which equals b. We want
to prove that for any AE , Pr[Γ 01 (AE)]− Pr[Γ 11 (AE)] is negligible.
Let Γ b2 be the same game in which the 3rd step of Γ
b
1 is replaced by
3: k ∈U K; k′ ∈U K; r ∈U {0, 1}(|m0|+λ)κ ; r′ ∈U {0, 1}(|m0|+λ)κ ;
c∗1 ← OLDPKE.Encpk(k′; r′); c∗2 ← mb ⊕ PRG|mb|(k); c∗ = 〈c∗1, c∗2〉
We construct A′E an adversary playing the IND-CPA game for OLDPKE by using
AE playing either Γ b1 or Γ
b
2 as follows: the generation of r, r
′, and the compu-
tation of c∗1 are outsourced to the IND-CPA game and A
′
E only submit the two
plaintexts k and k′. A′E produces b˜ as a final bit. We let Γ
b′ denote the IND-CPA
game for OLDPKE with bit b′. Clearly, we have Pr[Γ b1 (AE)] = Pr[Γ
0(A′E)] and
Pr[Γ b2 (AE)] = Pr[Γ
1(A′E)] since the winning condition is b˜ = b in all cases. As
OLDPKE is IND-CPA-secure we obtain that Pr[Γ b1 (AE)]−Pr[Γ b2 (AE)] is negligi-
ble.
Let now Γ b3 be the Γ
b
2 game in which the 3rd step is replaced by
3: k ∈U K; r ∈U {0, 1}(|m0|+λ)κ ; random ∈R {0, 1}|m|;
c∗1 ← OLDPKE.Encpk(k; r); c∗2 ← mb ⊕ random; c∗ = 〈c∗1, c∗2〉
We constructA′′ an adversary playing the IND game for PRG by usingAE playing
either Γ b2 or Γ
b
3 as follows: the generation of k
′ and the computation of either
PRG|mb|(k
′) or random are outsourced to the IND game. We let Γ˜ b
′′
denote the
IND game for PRG with bit b′′. Clearly, we have Pr[Γ b2 (AE)] = Pr[Γ˜
0(A′′)] and
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Pr[Γ b3 (AE)] = Pr[Γ˜
1(A′′)]. Since PRG is IND-secure we obtain that Pr[Γ b2 (AE)]−
Pr[Γ b3 (AE)] is negligible.
Let now Γ b4 be the Γ
b
3 game in which the 3rd step is replaced by
3: k ∈U K; r ∈U {0, 1}(|m0|+λ)κ ; random ∈R {0, 1}|m|;
c∗1 ← OLDPKE.Encpk(k; r); c∗2 ← random; c∗ = 〈c∗1, c∗2〉
Clearly, Γ b3 and Γ
b
4 produce c
∗ of same distribution so Pr[Γ b3 (AE)] = Pr[Γ
b
4 (AE)].
To summarize, we have that Pr[Γ b1 (AE)]−Pr[Γ b4 (AE)] is negligible. Since we
trivially have Pr[Γ 04 (AE)] = Pr[Γ
1
4 (AE)] we obtain that Pr[Γ
0
1 (AE)]−Pr[Γ 11 (AE)]
is negligible. uunionsq
3 Statistically-Secure Encryption
Throughout this section, we assume that all sets are enumerable so that we deal
with discrete probability theory.
Given two distributions P0 and P1 for a random variable X the statistical
distance is
d(P0, P1) =
1
2
∑
x
∣∣∣∣PrP0 [X = x]− PrP1 [X = x]
∣∣∣∣
The statistical distance is the exact measure to characterize the advantage of
the best distinguisher between the two distributions when using a single sam-
ple. When the statistical distance is negligible, the distributions are statistically
indistinguishable.
A cipher is defined by a distribution for a secret key K and a function Enc
mapping (x, k) to Enck(x) = y such that Enck is collision-free, so that we can
invert it. Given a random plaintext X which is independent from K, we define
the random ciphertext Y = EncK(X). We say that a security notion relative to
a cipher is universal if it does not depend on the distribution of X.
Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy is defined by the statistical independence
of X and Y . Although this definition does not look like universal at a first
glance, we can easily see that it is equivalent to the property that the function
(x, y) 7→ Pr[EncK(x) = y] only depends on y. This is a universal notion since it
only depends on the cipher design and not on the distribution of X.
Given a possible ciphertext y, the a posteriori distribution Py of X given y
is the marginal distribution of X conditioned to Y = y. Let P be the a priori
distribution of X. We have
d(P, Py) =
1
2
∑
x
|Pr[X = x]− Pr[X = x|Y = y]|
=
1
2
∑
x
Pr[X = x]
∣∣∣∣1− Pr[EncK(x) = y]Pr[Y = y]
∣∣∣∣
Shannon’s secrecy can be defined by saying that d(P, Py) = 0 for all y that
can occur. The next question relates to how to relax this security definition so
that secrecy is no longer perfect but is still universal and achieves some kind of
statistical security. A natural extension would we the following one.
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Definition 2. A cipher provides ε-imperfect secrecy if for any distribution of X
and all possible y we have d(P, Py) ≤ ε.
In [9, 10], Chor and Kushilevitz propose the following definition.
Definition 3. Given α ≥ 1, a cipher provides α-weak secrecy if for all x1, x2 ∈
Supp(X) and all y we have
1
α
Pr[Y = y|X = x2] ≤ Pr[Y = y|X = x1] ≤ αPr[Y = y|X = x2]
where Supp(X) is the set of all possible values of X. This property is universal.
Clearly, 1-weak secrecy is equivalent to Shannon’s perfect secrecy. If the cipher
achieves α-weak secrecy, for any x and any possible y, the ratio between Pr[Y =
y|X = x] and Pr[Y = y] is between 1α and α, so we have d(P, Py) ≤ α−12 . We
deduce the following theorem.
Theorem 4. α-weak secrecy implies α−12 -imperfect secrecy.
One drawback of α-weak secrecy is expressed by the following result.
Theorem 5 (Chor-Kushilevitz [9, 10]). If a cipher provides α-weak secrecy
then its domain must be finite.
Proof. Assuming that a cipher provides α-weak secrecy, we can take a possible
plaintext x2 and a possible key k. We let y = Enck(x2) so Pr[Y = y|X = x2] 6= 0.
We have that for all x1 in Supp(X),
Pr[Y = y|X = x1] ≥ 1
α
Pr[Y = y|X = x2] > 0
but the left-hand side is just Pr[DecK(y) = x1] so summing over many x1’s
should be at most 1. We deduce that the plaintext domain must be finite. uunionsq
We can now consider the notion of indistinguishability between the encryp-
tion of two arbitrary plaintexts. That is, given a plaintext x we consider the
distribution Qx for EncK(x).
Definition 6. A cipher is ε-statistically indistinguishable under one-time en-
cryption (IND-OTE) if for all x1 and x2 we have d(Qx1 , Qx2) ≤ ε.
Clearly, this notion is universal. We have
d(Qx1 , Qx2) =
1
2
∑
y
|Pr[Y = y|X = x1]− Pr[Y = y|X = x2]|
Clearly, if we have α-weak secrecy, we have d(Qx1 , Qx2) ≤ α−12 . We deduce the
following theorem.
Theorem 7. α-weak secrecy implies α−12 -statistically IND-OTE.
The converse is not true as the following example shows.
8
Example 8. Let {0, 1} be the plaintext domain. Let k = (κ, β) be composed by
an integer κ and a bit β such that Pr[K = k] = 122
−κ−1. We define
Enck(b) =
{
κ‖(β ⊕ b) if κ < n
(κ‖β) + 2b otherwise
Given a ciphertext y = z‖t with t ∈ {0, 1}, we have Pr[EncK(0) = y] = 122−z−1
and
Pr[EncK(1) = y] =
Pr[EncK(0) = y] if z < n0 if z = n2Pr[EncK(0) = y] if z > n
thus the cipher does not provide α-weak secrecy for any α < 2. Assuming an
a priori distribution of the plaintext we notice that Pr[X = 1|Y = n‖t] = 0
whereas Pr[X = 0|Y = n‖t] = 12 . So, we have d(P, Pn‖t) = 14 . The cipher does
not provide ε-imperfect secrecy for any ε < 14 . However,
d(Q0, Q1) =
1∑
t=0
(
+∞∑
z=n
Pr[EncK(0) = n‖t]
)
=
+∞∑
z=n
2−z−1 = 2−n
so the cipher is 2−n-IND-OTE secure.
The above example shows that α-weak secrecy is sufficient for IND-OTE secu-
rity but not necessary. Furthermore, the natural extension of Shannon’s perfect
secrecy by the notion of imperfect secrecy appears insufficient to capture the no-
tion of statistical security. So, the feasibility of IND-OTE secure encryption over
an infinite domain is a legitimate question. We answer below by the negative.
Theorem 9. Let ε < 1. If a given cipher is ε-statistically IND-OTE secure then
its plaintext domain is finite.
Proof. Let x1 be an arbitrary reference plaintext in the domain. We have that∑
y Pr[EncK(x1) = y] = 1 so there must exist a finite set A such that the sum
for y ∈ A is greater than 1+ε2 . For any x2 in the domain we have∑
y∈A
Pr[EncK(x2) = y] =
∑
y∈A
Pr[EncK(x1) = y]−∑
y∈A
(Pr[EncK(x1) = y]− Pr[EncK(x2) = y])
≥ 1 + ε
2
− ε
=
1− ε
2
Since ∑
x2∈Domain
∑
y∈A
Pr[EncK(x2) = y] =
∑
y∈A
∑
x2∈Domain
Pr[DecK(y) = x2]
≤ #A
we obtain that #A ≥ 1−ε2 #Domain so the domain is finite. uunionsq
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4 Strong Encryption over ℵ0 with Bounded Memory
Definition 10. Let Z be an alphabet. A streamline function with state space
S over Z is a family F = (fc)c∈Z of functions:
fc : S → Z∗ × S.
By abuse of notation, we define
fc(y, s) = 〈y‖y′, s′〉
where 〈y′, s′〉 = fc(s). We also define
fx(y, s) = (fxm ◦ · · · ◦ fx1)(y, s)
where x = x1 · · ·xm. Given x ∈ Z∗ and s ∈ S, we further define the function
Fs : Z∗ → Z∗ by fx(ε, s) = 〈Fs(x), ·〉.
A function over a language is called monotonic if for any x and y in the
language, the image of x is a prefix of the image of y whenever x is a prefix of
y. Note that all functions defined over a prefix code C are monotonic.
The following fact is pretty trivial:
Lemma 11. For a streamline function F with state space S over Z and s ∈ S,
the function Fs is monotonic.
Definition 12. A monotonic function G : C → Z∗ over a subset C of Z∗ is
streamlineable with σ states if there exists a streamline function F with a
state space S of σ elements and s ∈ S such that G equals Fs restricted to C. We
call Fs an implementation of G with σ states.
Lemma 13. All monotonic functions G : C → Z∗ on a subset C of Z∗ are
streamlineable with ℵ0 states.
The idea is to store the input of G in a state and to output something as soon
as possible.
Proof. We define G¯ : Z∗ → Z∗ by G¯(x) = G(y) where y is the longest prefix of
x in C if any and G¯(x) = ε otherwise. Clearly, G¯ is monotonic and equal to G
when restricted to C. Let S = Z∗ and define
fc(s) = 〈dropG¯(s)G¯(s‖c), s‖c〉,
where dropy(x) denotes string x with prefix y dropped (e.g. if x = y‖z, then
dropy(x) = z). We easily show that Fε is an implementation ofG for F = (fc)c∈Z .
uunionsq
Theorem 14. Let us consider an IND-rCCA-secure public-key encryption scheme
over M = {0, 1}∗‖>. For any key pair, the decryption function is not stream-
lineable with a finite number of states.
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Proof. Let Z = {0, 1,>,⊥} and M = {0, 1}∗‖>. Here > is a special character
which indicates a word termination so that M is a prefix code. We consider a
PKE over M. Given a key pair, encryption resp. decryption can be defined by
a function G¯r resp. D verifying:
1. G¯r : C → C is an injective function for any random coins r and
2. D : C → C ∪ {⊥} is a function such that D ◦ G¯r(x) = x for any x ∈ C and
any r.
We assume that D is streamlineable with σ states and later show that the PKE
is not IND-rCCA-secure.
Let s ∈ S, and G = (gc)c∈Z be such that |S| = σ, Gs is an implementation
of D with σ states, where gc corresponding to Gs is as in Definition 10.
Let bit`(x) denotes the `th character of x. Clearly, for x ∈M we have
x = trunc|x|−2(x)‖bit|x|−1(x)‖>.
Let Ck = {0, 1}k‖>. Let r be fixed. Given x, let `x be the minimal integer
such that D(trunc`x(G¯r(x))‖>) = x. Clearly, 1 ≤ `x ≤ |G¯r(x)| − 1. We define
Z(x) = gtrunc`x−1(G¯r(x))(ε, s).
For some probabilistic encryption G¯r(x), we interpret Z(x) to be the pair with
a partial decryption of G¯r(x) together with the internal state of the decryption
algorithm D. By definition, we have:
〈x, ·〉 = g> ◦ gbit`x (G¯r(x))(Z(x))
and
bit`x(G¯r(x)) ∈ {0, 1}.
Let X = {x ∈ Ck : Z(x) ∈ {ε} × S}. This is the set of plaintexts x of length k
such that the partial decryption of G¯r(x) is empty. We have
σ ≥ |Z(X )| ≥ |X |
2
.
Hence
Pr
x∈UCk
[Z(x) ∈ {ε} × S] ≤ 2σ
2k
.
If x 6∈ X we let Z(x) = 〈y, s′〉. Since y 6= ε, we have that y is a prefix of
Gs(trunc`x(G¯r(x))‖z) for any z. For z such that trunc`x(G¯r(x))‖z = G¯r(x) we
obtain that y is a prefix of x. For z = >, we obtain that y is also a prefix of
D(trunc`x−1(G¯r(x))‖>). Hence, D(trunc`x−1(G¯r(x))‖>) 6∈ {⊥, x} and it returns
a string whose first bit is trunc1(x).
Let T denote the event that
trunc1(D(trunc`x−1(G¯r(x))‖>)) = trunc1(x).
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Therefore
Pr
x∈UCk
[T ] ≥ 1− 2σ
2k
.
This holds for any implementation of D with σ states, and for any r so it holds
for random choices of r as well. For k ≥ log2 σ + 3, we have
Pr[T ] ≥ 3
4
. (1)
Let AE be defined as follows:
A
OrCCA1
E (pk)
1: pick m0 and m1 of length k = dlog2 σ + 3e with different first bit at
random
2: return m0, m1, and ρ = trunc1(m0)
A
OrCCA2
E (ρ, c
∗)
1: `← |c∗|
2: repeat
3: `← `− 1
4: m˜← OrCCA2 (trunc`−1(c∗)‖>)
5: until m˜ 6= ⊥ or ` = 1
6: if trunc1(m˜) ∈ {0, 1} then
7: return trunc1(m˜)⊕ ρ
8: else
9: return a random bit
10: end if
Clearly, while ` > `mb the rCCA oracle answers ⊥ because the decryption leads
to mb. When ` = `mb , the decryption is different from mb so the rCCA oracle is
not censored. Then T holds with probability at least 34 . In this case, the oracle
returns a string whose first bit is the one of mb Hence, if T occurs as soon as
` = `mb , we must have b = b˜. We obtain the advantage of AE to win the game
as
AdvIND-rCCAPKE,AE ≥ Pr[b˜ = b]−
1
2
≥ Pr[T ]− 1
2
≥ 1
4
.
Thus with non-negligible advantage an adversary AE will win the IND-rCCA
PKE game; and so a PKE with infinite domain and streamlineable decryption
with σ states cannot achieve IND-rCCA security when σ is polynomially bounded.
uunionsq
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This result is further supported by the fact that definitions of the decryption
algorithm for all known IND-CCA PKE schemes over infinite domains require
two passes: one for decrypting the ciphertext and one for validity check of the
decryption result.
In essence, this answers the question about the (in)existence of strong encryp-
tion schemes with streaming capability. We have shown that IND-rCCA-secure
encryption schemes with streaming encryption exist, but the decryption cannot
be streamlined.
Clearly, the same result applies to IND-rCCA-secure symmetric encryption.
5 Strong Encryption over ℵ0 with Bounded Time
We consider here a more general definition of functions on streams with bounded
resources. Instead of imposing a finite memory (or equivalently a finite number
of states) we require that for each new symbol the number of output symbols
is bounded; that is, in other words, the delay for returning something given an
input stream is bounded.
Definition 15. Let Z be an alphabet, and ∆ be some non-negative integer. A
streamline function F = (fc)c∈Z is called ∆-delayed if for any s we have
|(fc(s))1| ≤ ∆.
Clearly, given a streamline function F over a state space S, if Z and S are finite,
there exists ∆ such that F is ∆-delayed.
Theorem 16. Let us consider an IND-rCCA-secure public-key encryption scheme
over M = {0, 1}∗>. For any key pair and any ∆, the decryption function is not
∆-delayed.
Proof. With the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 14, for k > 2∆ we
have
gtrunc`x−1(G¯r(x))(ε, x) 6∈ {ε} × S
since gtrunc`x−1(G¯r(x)) and g> have outputs limited to length∆ each andD(G¯r(x)) =
x of length |x| = k. Hence, T occurs with probability 1 and our IND-rCCA ad-
versary has advantage at least 12 . uunionsq
6 Secure Encryption over a Continuous Domain
The previous results show the infeasibility of weakly secure encryption over the
infinite but enumerable ℵ0 domain. As the domain grows up we have to deal
with non-enumerable sets (e.g. the set of real numbers of cardinality 2ℵ0) so we
have to revisit all definitions for this latter case.
The standard Shannon notion of perfect secrecy adapts well by the notion
of statistical independence of X and Y for any distribution of X. We first show
13
that perfect secrecy can be achieved over the continuous set of cardinality 2ℵ0
taken from the unit interval [0, 1]. We take a uniformly distributed key K in
[0, 1] and define Enck(x) = (x+ k) mod 1.
For any density probability function f for X and for any measurable sets A
and B of [0, 1] we have that
Pr[X ∈ A, Y ∈ B] =
∫
x∈A
f(x) Pr[x+K ∈ B] dx
since Pr[x+K ∈ B] = µ(B) is not dependent on x we obtain Pr[X ∈ A, Y ∈ B] =
Pr[X ∈ A]µ(B). Applying this equation for A = [0, 1] we obtain Pr[Y ∈ B] =
µ(B) thus for all A and B we have Pr[X ∈ A, Y ∈ B] = Pr[X ∈ A] Pr[Y ∈ B]: X
and Y are statistically independent for any distribution of X. Thus, the cipher
provides perfect secrecy.
The question of computational security for this case is a little harder since
the computational model is not adapted to operations with real numbers.
To define a computational model able to deal with 2ℵ0 we should be able to
handle algorithms taking infinite sequences of bits as input and returning another
infinite sequence of bits. More precisely, an infinite sequence s = {si}ni=0 of bits
is an encoding of a real number from the interval [0, 1]. (To avoid confusion we
refer to s as a real number instead of a sequence.) This implies having memory
units able to store such reals and elementary operations on this type of data.
More precisely, given an algorithm A mapping m bits a1, . . . , am to n bits
b1, . . . , bn in t steps the new Turing machine shall be able to map m reals
α1, . . . , αm into n reals β1, . . . , βn in such a way that the ith bits of the β’s
are obtained by using A applied to the ith bits of the α’s. We obtain a kind of
“free” parallelism this way.
We shall also use arithmetic operations on real numbers in [0, 1] as well
as simple bit manipulations in the sequence. Assuming a prefix-free encoding
of an arbitrary bitstring, an infinite sequence of bits can be interpreted as a
sequence of bitstrings. Therefore we can use operations over sequence of bits
to define operations over sequences of bitstrings. We can do this to extend the
operations on bitstrings to operations on sequences of bitstrings by using the
free parallelism. For instance, we can concatenate two sequence of bitstrings
coordinate-wise. We can extract the sequence of the ith bit of a sequence of
bitstrings, etc.
The notion of stream of reals which cannot be stored with constant memory
becomes irrelevant since a list of reals can be encoded into a single sequence of
bits: a list of reals can be compressed into a single real. Clearly, the problem
of handling stream of reals with constant time and memory boils down to the
problem of encrypting a single real number.
Assuming that IND-CPA secure public key encryption over the domain {0, 1}
is feasible with these kinds of devices, we can transform it into an IND-CCA secure
cryptosystem over the set of reals by adapting the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform
[16, 17] in the random oracle model.
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In more detail, given an IND-CPA secure public key encryption OLDPKE over
the bit domain {0, 1}, we can define an IND-CPA secure public key encryption
TMPPKE over reals where the encryption algorithm TMPPKE.Encpk(m; r) takes
as input a (potentially infinite) sequence m = {mi}ni=0 of bits mi and a sequence
r = {ri}ni=0 of random strings ri; more precisely we have:
1. TMPPKE.KeyGen = OLDPKE.KeyGen
2. TMPPKE.Encpk(m; r) = {OLDPKE.Encpk(mi; ri)}ni=0
3. TMPPKE.Decsk(c) = {OLDPKE.Decsk(ci)}ni=0
Next, we construct an IND-CCA secure public key encryption NEWPKE as:
1. NEWPKE.KeyGen = TMPPKE.KeyGen
2. NEWPKE.Encpk(m; r) = TMPPKE.Encpk(〈m, r〉;H(〈m, r〉))
3. NEWPKE.Decsk(c) =
(a) 〈m′, h′〉 = TMPPKE.Decsk(c)
(b) if c = TMPPKE.Encpk(m′;h′), return m′
where 〈a, b〉 denotes the concatenation of the prefix-free encoding of a and b
applied in parallel on all coordinates; and H(x) denotes a random oracle call
used to compute a sequence of bitstrings of appropriate length.
We could investigate further and consider constructions without random ora-
cles, but this would be beyond our purpose. Our point is that secure and efficient
encryption over a domain larger than ℵ0 is feasible (modulo the required adap-
tations of the computational model).
7 Conclusion
We studied the imperfect notion of secrecy for one-time encryption. We proved
that the one by Chor and Kushilevitz is too strong to capture statistical indis-
tinguishability. We extended their impossibility result for encryption over ℵ0 to
a weaker notion.
We have shown the decryption (of bitstrings) cannot be implemented in
streaming mode with bounded resources without losing the security against
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. These results explain the reason why exist-
ing CCA-secure encryption schemes are designed with decryption that necessarily
performs two passes over the ciphertext before a plaintext is output; and indicate
the inexistence of strong encryption schemes over infinite domains. The practical
implications of this is that one needs to make a decision tradeoff: between strong
encryption (if streamlineability is not required) versus efficiency in practice i.e.
streaming capability (if strong encryption is not absolutely mandatory).
We finally observed that those impossibility results are contradicted when
the domain is larger, e.g. with 2ℵ0 . This kind of paradoxical situation reminds
some classical results from logic about decidability which can be lost over infinite
domains and recovered over yet larger ones.
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